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The First Amendment, which mandates that government shall
not abridge speech,' is considered to embody one of the most fundamental American principles. 2 Given the importance of free
speech in a democratic society, speakers must have access to a public forum where people congregate to guarantee the meaningful
exercise of this freedom. 3 When extending this right to private
I See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech ....
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." Id.
See JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS
AMENDMENTS 113-31 (1993) (explaining that the first three amendments of the Bill of
Rights were a means of balancing individual rights without compromising the
strength of the federal government). The Bill of Rights was a vital compromise leading to ratification of the Constitution in a nation split into two factions. See id. at 11314. The Federalists, including James Madison, declared that a federal government
would not be oppressive and could only grant power bestowed upon it by the Constitution. See id. at 113. Antifederalists, including Thomas Jefferson, expressed trepidation that a central government would lead to potential abuse against personal rights.
See id. Antifederalists were also concerned with protecting individual state powers but
used individual rights as a means to further their cause. See id. at 114.
2 See WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 2-3 (1988)
(discussing the philosophy of Alexander Meiklejohn, who found the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech as a means of empowering the people with a final
check on political control of the government); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 24 (1971) (holding that a state may not criminalize the public display of an expletive because it violates the First Amendment). Justice John Harlan stated that:
The Constitutional right of free expression ... is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the
belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. Justification for freedom of speech was discussed in John Stuart
Mill's essay "On Liberty," which suggested that speech could not only extrapolate
truth, but also allow individuals to clarify their own beliefs. See VILE, supra note 1, at
122.
3 See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 3. Use of streets, parks, and other public places
were made available for speech through United States Supreme Court cases. See id.
(citing Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
391 U.S. 308, 319 (1968); Hague v. Congress of Indus. Org., 319 U.S. 141, 149
(1943)). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12, at
576-736 (discussing an individual's rights of expression and communication). Public
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fora, however, courts must also accommodate the private interests
of property owners.4
Individual state constitutions also protect freedom of expression and may do so in a more expansive fashion, encompassing
greater freedom of speech protection than granted by the First
Amendment.5 New Jersey's Constitution provides for freedom of
speech.6 In a recent case, New Jersey CoalitionAgainst War in the Middle East v. JM.B. Realty Corp.,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court examined the state's constitutional freedom of expression rights in a
private property context, specifically in regional and community
shopping centers.8 The New Jersey Supreme Court, over a strong
places, given their role as important avenues for people unable to access more costly
methods of communication, led to the granting of a special legal status of "public
forum" to public venues such as parks, streets, and sidewalks. See TRIBE, supra, at 689.
Such places must allow First Amendment activities and cannot prohibit expression to
spare public cost or inconvenience. See id. Other sites trigger "public forum" status
based upon the deliberate use and placement for the exchange of ideas between
members of the public. See id. at 690; see also Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 552 (1976) (recognizing municipal theater as public forum designed to
be expressive; thus the municipality could not refuse to allow a production of the play
"Hair").
4 See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 694. Homeowners may exclusively prevent unwanted
speech on their property, thus placing a homeowner's right to exclude above the
speaker's right to intrude. See id. The outcome may be different where greater access
is expected. See id. at 694-95. Given the tension between property rights and speech,
often times one right will be granted a superior status at the expense of the other. See
FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 37. With societal changes altering the historical places of
congregation and formally supplanting very active public forums, private property
rights will not afford a strict denial of free expression rights in today's society. See id.
5 See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 75 (interpreting numerous state constitutions
involving free speech access on private property).
6 See N.J. CONST. art. I, 6. The New Jersey Constitution states that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right [and that] [n]o law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
7 138 N.J. 326, 650 A.2d 757 (1994).
8 See id. at 332, 650 A.2d at 760. A regional shopping center is defined by the
industry as one that:
provides shopping goods, general merchandise, apparel, furniture and
home furnishings in full depth and variety. It is built around the fullline department store, with a minimum GLA [gross leasable area] of
100,000 square feet, as the major drawing power. For even greater comparative shopping, two, three or more department stores may be included. In theory a regional center has a GLA of 400,000 square feet,
and can range from 300,000 to more than 1,000,000 square feet.
Id. at 339, 650 A.2d at 764 (citation omitted). Community shopping centers lack the
variety of its regional mall counterpart. See id. Often built around a smaller store, a
community center, as defined by the industry, commonly possesses gross leasable area
of 150,000 square feet but may range from between 100,000 to 300,000 square feet.
See id.

1996]

NOTE

dissent which emphasized the constitutional rights of private property owners,9 held that the expression sought by the plaintiff-noncommercial leafletting-must be allowed by regional shopping
mall owners, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. 10
The New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East (the
Coalition) was a group formed to publicly oppose President Bush's
plan of military intervention in the Persian Gulf.11 In an effort to
gain support for its views, the Coalition targeted ten shopping
malls for a large scale leafletting campaign on two days in November 1990.2 Representatives of the Coalition initially sought per13
mission to leaflet, which was denied outright by six of the centers.
Of the four centers that did not deny permission, three condi-

tioned approval upon a showing of liability insurance coverage.
9 See id. at 390, 650 A.2d at 789 (Garibaldi,
10 See id. at 344, 650 A.2d at 766.

4

J., dissenting).

11 See id. at 336 n.2, 650 A.2d at 762 n.2. The Coalition included:
New Jersey SANE/FREEZE, New Jersey Citizen Action, Monmouth
County Pax Christi, New Jersey Council of Churches, The New Jersey
Rainbow Coalition, The Baptist Peace Fellowship, The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Drew University
Peacemakers, The Monmouth County Coalition for the Homeless, The
Jersey Cape Coalition for Peace and Justice, The New Jersey Peace Mission, The New Jersey Pledge of Resistance, The South Jersey Campaign
for Peace and Justice, and The Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom.
Id. The objectives of the Coalition were:
1) to prevent United States military intervention in the Persian Gulf, 2)
to prevent the establishment of a United States base in the Middle East,
3) to obtain a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis by an international agency and 4) to divert the expenditure of United States tax dollars from defense spending to domestic spending.
Id.
12 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 336, 650 A.2d at 762. The 10 centers that constituted the defendants were Cherry Hill Center, Woodbridge Center, Livingston Mall,
Rockaway Townsquare, Monmouth Mall, The Mall at Mill Creek, Riverside Square
Shopping Center, The Mall at Short Hills, Quakerbridge Mall, and Hamilton Mall. See
id. at 379-90, 650 A.2d at 784-89. November 10, 1990, was part of the Veterans Day
holiday weekend, thus deliberately chosen due to an increase in expected shoppers.
See id. at 338, 650 A.2d at 763.
13 See id. at 337, 650 A.2d at 762. The four centers that did not outright deny
access were the Monmouth Mall, The Mall at Mill Creek, Cherry Hill Center, and
Woodbridge Center. See id.
14 See id., 650 A.2d at 763. The Mall at Mill Creek, Cherry Hill Mall, and Woodbridge Center sought liability coverage of $1,000,000 for bodily injury and between
$50,000-$1,000,000 in property damage coverage. See id.; see also Eric Neisser, Charging
for Free Speech: Insuranceand Police Fees in the Marketplace of Ideas, N.J. LAw., Aug./Sept.
1994, at 39. (discussing the costs inherent in exercising free speech activities). Neisser explained the difficulties involved in obtaining these types of one-day policies: the
insurers risk assessment must be considered and the group's message may be disap-
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The Coalition brought suit in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, seeking an injunctive order that would
grant access for leafletting in the ten defendant shopping centers.' 5 Relying on State v. Schmid,I6 which created a three-prong test
to determine the appropriate level of protection for free speech on
private property, the chancery division upheld the defendants' private property rights.1 7 Finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that members' activity would not be in discord with the
public and private uses for which these malls were created, the
court denied injunctive relief."
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the chancery court. 9 In a per
curiam opinion, the appellate court concluded that the chancery
court's findings were completely supported by the record.2" The
court utilized the three-pronged analysis established in Schmid and
stressed that the mall's predominant purpose and invitation to the
public was of a commercial nature.2
proved. See Neisser, supra, at 40. While acknowledging the broad expression rights
found in some state constitutions, the author noted that there are six problems with
insurance and police fee requirements. See id. The problems include the "lack of
precise standards to guide administrative discretion, charging sponsors for the costs
of controlling opponents, [ ] discriminating against expressive activities, lack of an
exception for indigents, failure to establish a significant risk of government liability
and failure to consider less burdensome alternatives." Id. Neisser concluded that the
costs of these requirements are borne by the taxpayer and society as a whole; thus, the
community is forced to fund the free exchange of ideas. See id. at 41.
15 See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
266 N.J. Super. 195, 197, 628 A.2d 1094, 1095 (Ch. Div. 1991).
16 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980). For a full discussion of Schmid, see infra notes
49-61 and accompanying text.
17 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 266 N.J. Super. at 204, 628 A.2d at 1099.
18 See id. Using a factor analysis method created in Schmid, the court clearly accepted the normal purpose of these shopping centers to be commercial, rejecting the
testimony that malls had become the functional equivalent of pre-World War II business districts. See id. at 201, 628 A.2d at 1097. As to the public's invitation, the trial
court accepted a general invitation for non-shopping purposes (e.g., walking, promotional activity, dining) but surmised the ultimate goal of this invitation was to increase
customer count, sales, and profits. See id. at 202, 628 A.2d at 1098. Lastly, upon examination of the mall owners' policy toward leafletting, the court again ascertained that
prior activities that were promotional in nature were done to establish community
goodwill and subsequently an increase in sales for its retailers. See id. at 203, 628 A.2d
at 1099. The court continued by noting that activities deemed controversial by mall
management were not permitted, and since all the malls were not homogeneous a
uniform treatment should be rejected. See id. at 204, 628 A.2d at 1099.
19 See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
266 N.J. Super. 159, 161, 628 A.2d 1075, 1076 (App. Div. 1993) (per curiam).
20 See id.
21 See id. The court declined to address defendants' assertion that permitting
leafletting would constitute a taking of property for public use without just compensa-
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The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification. 2 2 In reversing the appellate division, ChiefJustice Wilentz, writing for the
majority,2 3 applied the State v. Schmid balancing test. 24 The majority determined that in weighing free speech rights of public groups
against the rights of private property owners, the outcome must
favor the right to leaflet in regional shopping centers. 25 Additionally, the majority found that in balancing free speech and private
property rights, the latter should yield to the former in light of
mall owners' intentional transformation of the property into a
modern public square. 26 Finally, the majority declared that leafletting constitutes neither a taking of private property nor an abridgment of property owners' free speech rights under the Federal and
New Jersey Constitutions.2 7
tion and a denial of the defendants' freedom of speech rights. See id. at 162, 628 A.2d
at 1076. Additionally, in light of the decision, the appellate division did not address
plaintiff's challenge to the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the shopping
malls. See id.
22 See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
134 N.J. 564, 636 A.2d 522 (1993).
23 See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
138 N.J. 326, 404, 650 A.2d 757, 796 (1994). Justices Handler, O'Hern, and Stein
joined the chief justice. Id.
24 See id. at 362, 650 A.2d at 775.
25 See id. at 357-62, 650 A.2d at 773. Factually, the majority found the first two
factors to bode in favor of the right to leaflet. See id. at 361, 650 A.2d at 775. Constitutionally, the majority emphasized that the inclusiveness of the facility, including
places to walk, talk, dine, meet, or just "hang out" tended to favor a public invitation
to bring the entire community into its center. See id. at 358, 650 A.2d at 773. The
majority made special mention of the community booths prevalent in some of the
centers that invite political and community organizations to distribute circulars and
other information to the shoppers. See id. at 359, 650 A.2d at 774. Thus, the majority
determined in most cases it was not the constitutionality of leafletting at issue, but
rather the extent of regulation that should be granted to defendants. See id. at 360,
650 A.2d at 774. According to the majority, the third factor-compatibility between
the speech and the use of the private property-was also favorable to the leaflets. See
id. at 362, 650 A.2d at 775. The chief justice emphasized that the activity had taken
place in downtown districts for years without negative results, and the property owners' claim that leafletting could be damaging to profits was inconsistent with the four
centers granting permission to the plaintiff. See id. at 361, 650 A.2d at 775. Finally,
the majority reiterated that regulations will ensure that leafletting will not interfere
with business to a damaging extent. See id. at 362, 650 A.2d at 775.
26 See id. at 363-64, 650 A.2d at 776. Chief Justice Wilentz declared free speech
interest to be "the most substantial in our constitutional scheme," and opined that
these activities could be exercised without any detriment to owners' profits and shoppers' enjoyment, especially given the mall's power to implement reasonable regulations. See id. The chiefjustice also determined that by opening up their facilities as a
public gathering place and encouraging vast public use of their property, mall owners
have themselves tipped the scales toward the public use and diminished the private
property interest. See id. at 363, 650 A.2d at 776.
27 See id. at 370-71, 650 A.2d at 779. In rejecting the federal claims, the majority
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The United States Supreme Court considered these free
speech concerns early on in Marsh v. Alabama,2 8 which involved a
conflict between expressive and private property rights. 29 The
Supreme Court determined that an owner's property rights must
increasingly surrender to the constitutional rights of the public
users as the owner allows greater public access to his property for
his advantage.3" In balancing the rights of free press and religion
against the rights of these property owners, the Supreme Court
held that First Amendment liberties occupied an elevated
position.3 1
In 1968, the Supreme Court extended protection to picketers
of a private shopping center in Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.3 2 Drawing from its decision in
Marsh, the Court noted that privately owned property could, in
some instances, be subject to the public's First Amendment
rights.3 3 The Court therefore held that the shopping center was
relied upon Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See id. The majority weighed free speech against the minimal interference these rights would cause
mall owners and determined that deference must be given to the expressive conduct.
See id. at 371, 650 A.2d at 780.
28 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
29 See id. at 502-03. Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, attempted to distribute religious
leaflets on the property of a company-owned town. See id. The town, owned by the
Gulf Shipbuilding Company, resembled many American towns and could not be distinguished without knowledge of property lines. See id. Standing near the post office
on the business block, Marsh tried to distribute religious literature in spite of a posted
public notice prohibiting such action. See id. at 503. When warned to stop the activity, Marsh declined and subsequently was arrested for violating an Alabama law that
criminalized remaining on private premises after being warned to leave. See id. at 50304.
30 See id. at 506.
31 See id. at 509. Justice Black stated that "the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment 'lies at the foundation of free government by free
men' and we must in all cases 'weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise
the .. .reasons . . . in support of the regulation . . .of [those] rights."' Id. (citing
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
32 391 U.S. 308 (1968). On December 17, 1965, Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 picketed a supermarket in a shopping center, displaying disapproval
of its nonunion status. See id. at 311. This peaceful picketing was limited almost entirely to a parcel pickup area and adjacent parking area, and was carried out by employees of competing stores who disregarded signs prohibiting "trespass or
solicitation." See id. at 311-12. Weis Markets, the mall owner, sought an injunction
that was granted by the trial court. See id. at 312-13. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the injunction on the basis that the picketer's actions constituted trespass.
See id.
33 See id. at 325. Comparing a shopping center to the business center of a municipality, the Court focused on the historical access granted to First Amendment rights
in generally public places and reiterated that picketers could not be completely
barred from a public business center on the premise that ownership of the property
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required to extend First Amendment rights to the union
picketers.3 4
Four years later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,5 the Supreme Court
tackled the issue reserved in Logan Valley: whether it is constitutionally permissible for private shopping center owners to prohibit
leafletting on their property that is unrelated to its operations.3 6 In
this action for injunctive relief brought by individuals seeking to
distribute handbills regarding the Vietnam War, the issue reserved
in Logan Valley-whether it is constitutionally permissible for a private shopping center owner to prohibit leafletting-the Court held
that there was no public dedication of the owner's property that
would entitle leafletters to exert their First Amendment rights.3 7
In distinguishing Lloyd, the Court declared that the war protest was in no way related to the purpose and function of the mall
and noted that because the message was directed to the public in
general, the leafletting could have been carried out at any public
venue.3 ' The Court stressed that property should not lose its private status merely because the general public uses the property for
specific purposes. 9
was in the municipality. See id. at 315. The Court further stated that the similarities
between the forum in Marsh, i.e., business block, and this case, emphasized the general public's complete access to the center's property. See id. at 317-18.
34 See id. at 325. The Court likewise extended this right to leaflet distribution,
pointing out that restraints imposed upon the picketers were geared toward the conduct more than the speech. See id. at 322 n.11. The Court concluded that the fact
that speech may be accompanied by conduct will not allow for the suppression of
speech under the guise of eliminating the conduct. See id. at 323.
35 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
36 See id. at 552.
37 See id. at 569. An attempt to pass out handbills protesting the Vietnam War
inside a privately owned mall resulted in the mall management's request that the
participants conduct their efforts on public sidewalks near the mall but outside the
center. See id. at 556. The leafletters complied but later filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. See id.
The Court, in holding for the defendants, declared that the private property
owner's rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prevailed because "[no] person shall ...be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. at 567. The Court further noted that the Fifth
Amendment proscribes "the taking of private property... for public use without just
compensation." Id. In balancing First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the
Court indicated that there was no public dedication of the shopping center for public
use to entitle protesters to First Amendment protection. See id. at 570.
38 See id. at 564. The Court emphasized that the holding in Logan Valley was to be
limited to the involved activity-picketing a non-union supermarket-and the relationship between the protest and the use of the shopping center. See id. at 563-64.
The Court further noted that no other location afforded the picketers a reasonable
forum to convey their message. See id. at 563.
39 See id. at 569.
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In Hudgens v. NationalLabor Relations Board,4' the Court revisited the issue of picketing a retail store in a shopping center. 4' The
majority declared that the holding in Logan Valley was rejected by
the Lloyd Court 42 and thus concluded that the picketers did not
have a right to protest inside the center.4 3 The Court emphasized
the First and Fourteenth Amendments' protection against "state
action" but found none in the private property owners' restrictions
on picketing.'
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided PruneyardShopping
Center v. Robins,45 which analyzed a state's ability, through its consti46
tution, to allow free speech access in a private shopping center.
The Supreme Court held that California's Constitution, which allowed its citizens to exercise free speech rights in a private shopping center open to the public, did not infringe upon the property
40 424 U.S. 507 (1976).

See id. at 508. Union members picketed a shoe store located inside a privately
owned shopping center to protest a shoe company's refusal to agree to demands during contract negotiations. See id. at 509. The owner of the center, through his agent,
threatened to have the picketers arrested for criminal trespass. See id The picketers
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
claiming that the threat violated the National Labor Relations Act. See id. at 509-10.
The NLRB entered a "cease-and-desist order" against the mall owner, holding that the
threat of arrest violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), and that the issue must be measured
by a "First Amendment standard." See id. at 510.
42 See id. at 518. The Court reiterated that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
protect free speech rights against "state action" and not against a private owner using
his property in a nondiscriminatory manner. See id. at 519.
43 See id. at 521. Constitutional free expression, according to the Court, had no
relevance in the case and the picketers' rights were dependent exclusively upon the
National Labor Relations Act. See id. The Court remanded the case to the NLRB for
reconsideration under the criteria set forth in the National Labor Relations Act. See
id. at 523.
44 See id. at 519.
45 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
46 See id. at 76-77. Pruneyard was a privately owned shopping mall in Campbell,
California. See id. at 77. Local high school students set up a table in the central courtyard to distribute leaflets and solicit petitions to be sent to Congress protesting a
resolution by the United Nations against "Zionism." See id.
Mall security requested that the students stop their activity and leave the premises. See id. The students complied with the mall's request but later filed a lawsuit to
enjoin the center from denying access to the center for their expressive activities. See
id.
The California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution protected
reasonably exercised expressive activity even on some privately owned property. See
id. at 78. The United States Supreme Court cited to the California Constitution,
which provided that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right [and that a]
law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." Id. at 79-80 n.2 (quoting
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2).
41
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owners' First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4 7 Thus, the
Court proclaimed that states were free to grant greater free speech
protection in their state constitutions than the federal
48
counterpart.
Against this federal backdrop, the Supreme Court of New
47 See id. at 82-88. The Court initially asserted that its reasoning in Lloyd did not
limit a state from exercising its own police power and that states could provide for
more expansive liberties in their own constitutions. See id. at 81. Using this rationale,
the Court then examined whether denying a property owner a right to exclude others
in this context would constitute a "taking of property without just compensation" in
violation of the Fifth Amendment and a "deprivation of property without due process" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 82. Deeming the "right to
exclude" a vital property right, the Court nevertheless noted that the expressive activity would not reduce the value or the viable use of the property. See id. at 83. Thus,
the Court found no violation of the Takings Clause. See id. Likewise, the Supreme
Court upheld the California court's ruling that the decision was neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable in its placement and it was not unrelated to the promotion of more
expansive free speech rights in California. See id. at 85. The asserted argument that a
property owner should not be forced to use his property as a forum for another's
speech was rejected by the Court on the grounds that the views of leafletters will
typically not be identified with the property's owner, no specific message is demanded
by the state for display on private property, and the owner could post signs disclaiming any connection with the speakers. See id. at 87.
48 See id. at 81. The PruneyardCourt discussed that states have the ability to exercise
their own police power through appropriate state law and constitutional measures.
See id. In distinguishing this case from Lloyd, the Court emphasized that the key element in favor of the leafletters was California's constitutional and statutory provisions
that created rights in the use of this property-state law provisions that did not exist
in Lloyd. See id.; see also John A. Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State
Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SvRACUSE L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1986) (discussing the
conflict between the First Amendment, which does not guarantee free speech access
in shopping centers, and state constitutions, which may interpret this access as a right
under their provisions). A second concern dealt with defining the "state action" doctrine, a premise that guarantees freedom of speech from governmental authorities,
not private persons. See id. at 2.
See also Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: PoliticalActivity on Private Lands, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 633, 634 (1991), where the author notes that since Pruneyard,the struggle between free speech rights and private property rights has moved into other areas
related by some form of public access like university campuses, office parks, and residential communities. See id. The key to resolving these issues is to define what a
public forum is, what its importance to our political process is, and an indication of
why land should or should not be classified as a public forum. See id. at 635. These
diametric issues must be balanced against information that has historically been vital
to the political process. See id. at 635-36.
See also Alan E. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, PruningPruneyard: Limiting
Free Speech Rights Under State Constitutionson the Property of Private Medical Clinics Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAViS L. Rv. 1073, 1092 (1991), where the authors stated
that the fundamental question after Pruneyard was whether free speech rights could
be asserted on private property other than shopping centers. See id. The authors note
that this question has left the door open for an array of conflict between private property owners and individuals desiring to use their property for expressive purposes. See
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Jersey had the opportunity to strike a balance between free speech
access and private property rights in State v. Schmid.4 9 At issue in
Schmid was the constitutionality of a trespass conviction of a distributor of political materials on the campus of Princeton University.5"
The defendant argued that the conviction violated his constitutional liberties of free speech and assembly under both the Federal
and State Constitutions.5 The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously reversed the trespassing conviction.52 Holding that the private university was not subject to First Amendment obligations
under the "state action" doctrine," the court nevertheless required
that the university guarantee expressive freedom in this case.5 4
The court noted that constitutional protection of free speech extends not only to state action but also to oppressive conduct by
private entities that, due to their public use, have assumed a similar
constitutional obligation. 55
49

84 NJ. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).

50 See id. at 538, 423 A.2d at 616. Defendant, a member of the United States Labor

Party, distributed political leaflets on the main campus of a private institution in New
Jersey, Princeton University. See id. at 538-39, 423 A.2d at 616. Defendant was not a
student at the University but had full knowledge of the University's regulations, which
required permission for the distribution of materials by off-campus organizations. See
id. at 539, 541, 423 A.2d at 616, 618.
51 See id. at 542, 423 A.2d at 618. Specifically, the defendant asserted that his conduct in distributing political literature was an exercise of both his freedoms of speech
and assembly and that Princeton University had a constitutional obligation to allow
his activity on campus. See id.
52 See id. at 569, 423 A.2d at 633.
53 See id. at 544, 423 A.2d at 619. The court determined that a private university
does not act on behalf of state government, nor is there a connection to deem it a
state actor; thus, given its autonomy, Princeton University is not subject to First
Amendment obligations under the state action doctrine. See id. at 547-48, 423 A.2d at
621. The court determined that although Princeton University had an ongoing relationship with the state through accreditation and various state educational programs,
these did not equate to state action. See id. at 547, 423 A.2d at 621. The court determined that Princeton University was predominantly private and largely autonomous
in its function. See id. at 548, 423 A.2d at 621. Without this joint and interdependent
relationship, the court was unable to find the University to be engaging in state action. See id., 423 A.2d at 621-22. The court decided not to determine if Princeton
University devoted its property for the use of the public in such a manner as to necessitate First Amendment freedoms, choosing instead to base its holding on more compelling state constitutional grounds. See id. at 553, 423 A.2d at 624.
54 See Schmid, 84 N.J. at 569, 423 A.2d at 633; see also N.J. CONS-. art. I, 6 (providing in part that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects being responsible for the abuse of that right [and that] [n]o law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press"); N.J. CONST. art. I,
18 (providing that "people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for
the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to
petition for redress of grievances").
55 See Schmid, 84 N.J. at 560, 423 A.2d at 628.
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The Schmid court created a three-prong test to determine the
degree of protection that should be accorded to speech and assem-

bly on private property.5 6 The NewJersey Supreme Court declared
that courts must balance "(1) the nature, purposes, and primary
use of such private property, generally its 'normal' use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's invitation to use that property, and

(3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such
property in relation to both the private and public use of the property."5 7 Applying the test, the court determined that (1) a university's primary use was the pursuit of truth and knowledge;5 (2) as
an institute of higher learning, Princeton sought a diverse range of
political ideas and endorsed an open campus policy to the public;5 9
and (3) the information sought to be disseminated by the defendant was not in conflict with the goals of the University.6" The court
vacated the conviction but stressed that the property owner could
implement reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to pro61
tect the legitimate interests of the University.
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on this public accommodation policy in Uston v. Resorts InternationalHotel, Inc. 62 The
court found that without a rule from the Casino Control Commission, the hotel could not preclude a professional cardcounter 6 4
56
57

See id. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
Id.

58 See id. at 564, 423 A.2d at 630. The court noted that free expression was necessary to achieve the goal of knowledge and the development of students. See id.
59 See id. at 565, 423 A.2d at 631. Noting that the University had endorsed a policy
of full exposure to the "outside world," the court cited to Princeton's own regulations
as an invitation for public use of its facilities. See id. at 565 n.10, 423 A.2d at 631 n.10.
60 See id. at 555-56, 423 A.2d at 631.
61 See id. at 567, 423 A.2d at 632. With the holding in Schmid, New Jersey became
the first state to address the conflict between free speech and private property and
created a balancing approach followed by other states. See Brownstein & Hankins,
supra note 48, at 1107-12; see also Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635
P.2d 108, 116-17 (Wash. 1981) (holding that courts must evaluate the nature of the
subject property, the nature of the speech, and the potential for the regulation of
speech in soliciting signatures in shopping center cases); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432
A.2d 1382, 1390 (Pa. 1981) (promulgating a test that balanced a college's right to
protect and possess its property against the leafletter's freedom of expression).
62 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982).
63 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 to -152 (West 1988) (codifying the New
Jersey Casino Control Act).
64 See Uston, 89 N.J. at 166, 445 A.2d at 371. Uston was a renowned blackjack player
who was able to tilt the odds slightly in his favor by incorporating specific betting
strategies with the tracking of cards previously dealt. See id. This "cardcounting"
method increased the probability of a profitable session at the casino over a period of
time. See id.
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from playing blackjack in its casino. 65 Noting the purposeful invitation to the public, for the casino's benefit the court reiterated that
as private premises were more expansively open to the public, owners had a greater duty not to unreasonably exclude people.6 6
The Superior Court, Appellate Division, case of Bellemead Development Corp. v. Schneide-t6 7 involved a landlord seeking an injunction
against union members leafletting non-managerial office workers
in front of a private office building.' The court noted that a balance must be struck between free speech and private property
rights only when the owner held out the property for some public
use.6 9 In upholding the injunction, the court held that because the
owner did not invite the general public to use the property, the
defendants' free speech claim must be denied.70
Similarly, Brown v. Davis7 pitted an anti-abortion citizens'
group attempting to leaflet cars on a private parking lot against the
landlord-owner of a multi-business office complex housing a facility that performed abortions.7 2 Applying the three-factor Schmid
65 See id. at 175, 445 A.2d at 376. After writing the Casino Commissioner on January 30, 1979, and receiving a response that no statute or regulation prevented the
exclusion of card counters from a casino, Resorts banned Uston from its blackjack
tables and instituted a policy to ban all other players that met Resorts' "cardcounters"
standards. See id. at 167, 445 A.2d at 372.
66 See id. at 173, 445 A.2d at 375. The court ultimately held that without a Casino
Commission regulation banning card counters, Resorts had no power to deny Uston
access to its facility. See id. at 175, 445 A.2d at 376. The court granted a 90-day order
against Uston during which time the Commission could act on the matter. See id.
The court declined to consider whether a Commission rule would pass constitutional
muster, but instead suggested that the legislature's public policy concerns would rest
in the public's confidence that casinos were run in a credible and fair fashion. See id.
at 174-75, 445 A.2d at 375- 76.
67 196 N.J. Super. 571, 483 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1984).
68 See id. at 571, 483 A.2d at 830. Union members distributed leaflets on private
sidewalks in front of five office buildings that comprised the "Meadowlands Corporate
Center." See id. at 574, 483 A.2d at 831-32.
69 See id., 483 A.2d at 832. The court stated that public use is a threshold issue that
must be reached before analyzing whether the expressive activity should be permitted. See id. at 575, 483 A.2d at 832. According to the court, even though the speech
was related to the normal use of the property, the Schmid balancing test would not
apply because the threshold issue could not be met. See id.
70 See id. at 576, 483 A.2d at 833.
71 203 N.J. Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900 (Ch. Div. 1984).
72 See id. at 43, 495 A.2d at 901. Plaintiffs actions consisted of carrying signs, calling and shouting to prospective patients, and other expressive activities along a public
right of way 45-100 feet from the entrance to the center. See id. at 44, 495 A.2d at 902.
The defendants did not contest that action but instead challenged the demonstrators'
right to enter a private parking lot to distribute their literature. See id. at 44-45, 495
A.2d at 902. After refusing to leave at the owner's request, Brown, a member of the
anti-abortion protesters, was charged with criminal trespass under N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:18-3. See id. at 45, 495 A.2d at 902.
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test, the chancery division declared that the office complex did not
have to allow members of the citizens' group to enter the property
to leaflet.7" In denying injunctive relief to the plaintiff, the court
emphasized that in weighing the factors, all three tilted in favor of
the private owner excluding the expressional activity.74
In the criminal trespass case involving the same defendant,
State v. Brown,75 the appellate division upheld the trespass conviction.7 6 Reluctant to apply the Schmid test, the court held that access to the property in question clearly was by invitation only, and
the property was not devoted to any public use. 7 Alternatively, the
appellate division proffered that if the Schmid test was applicable,
the defendant still would not be granted relief under the test's factor analysis.7 8
The appellate division examined the trespass conviction of two
campaigners leafletting automobiles at the Bergen Mall in State v.
Gerstmann & Chuman.79 The appellate division, based upon
Defendant, Davis Enterprises, owned two acres of land that housed the buildings
identified as "Avenues of Commerce." See id. at 43, 495 A.2d at 901. Cherry Hill
Women's Center, a tenant of the center and a private medical facility, was also joined
as a defendant. See id. The Center's services included gynecological consultations
and procedures, pregnancy tests, and abortions. See id. Patients were normally admitted by appointment, but one was not necessary for a pregnancy test. See id. Other
tenants in the complex included general business offices, storage facilities, and warehouses. See id. at 4344, 495 A.2d at 901.
73 See id. at 49, 495 A.2d at 904.
74 See id. at 47-49, 495 A.2d at 903-04. The court noted that in assessing the first
prong of the Schmid test, the normal use of the property was for employees, tenants,
and prospective customers of limited services and was therefore not equivalent to a
shopping center. See id. at 47, 495 A.2d at 903. Likewise, in weighing the second
prong the court did not interpret advertisements and signs to express a "general invitation to the public." See id. In examining the third prong, the court noted that the
expressive activity was incompatible with the operation of the Women's Center and
thus weighed in favor of the property owner. See id. at 47-48, 495 A.2d at 903-04.
75 212 N.J. Super. 61, 513 A.2d 974 (App. Div. 1986).
76 See id. at 67-68, 513 A.2d at 978.
77 See id. at 65-66, 513 A.2d at 976-77. The court distinguished this case from
Planned Parenthoodv. Cannizzaro, 204 N.J. Super. 531, 499 A.2d 535 (Ch. Div. 1985).
See id. In distinguishing the case the court found that the premises in the present
action were not the recipient of public funds, nor was the complex used only by the
facility that performed abortions. See id. at 65, 513 A.2d at 976.
78 See id. at 66, 513 A.2d at 977. The appellate division, examining the first two
factors of the Schmid test, noted that the office complex was not the equivalent of a
downtown shopping center and that the invitation to the general public was for private purposes. See id. Applying the third factor of the test, the appellate division
followed the opinion of Judge Lowengrub in Bellemead Development Corp. v. Schneider,
196 N.J. Super. 571, 483 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1984), finding the intrusion to be incompatible with the tenants' expectation of quiet enjoyment of the premises. See id. at 6768, 513 A.2d at 977-78.
79 198 N.J. Super. 175, 177, 486 A.2d 912, 913 (App. Div. 1985). The defendants,
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jeopardy, dismissed a state appeal of the trespass acquitdouble
tal.8 Although the defendants desired to waive any double jeopappellate court
ardy claim and to seek an advisory opinion, the
81
concluded this would undermine public policy.
Similar to Brown v. Davis,8 2 Planned Parenthood of Monmouth
8 3 also examined the free speech rights of
County, Inc. v. Cannizzaro
anti-abortion picketers on private property." In upholding a permanent injunction against the picketers, the chancery division clarified the considerations the court must examine in classifying
property as a public facility. 85 Using the Schmid analysis, the court
candidates in a Bergen County freeholder election, placed campaign literature on
cars parked at the Bergen Mall, a large enclosed shopping center. See id. After being
requested to stop, the defendants continued the activity and were subsequently
charged with criminal trespass pursuant to N.J. STAT ANN. § 2C:18-3. See id. at 177-78,
486 A.2d at 913.
80 See id. at 177, 486 A.2d at 913. In municipal court, the defendants asserted their
Article I, paragraph 6 rights under the NewJersey Constitution. See id. The municipal court judge found the defendants guilty of trespass and held that the criteria of
the Schmid test did not affect the leafletting. See id. at 179, 486 A.2d at 914. On appeal, the Superior Court, Law Division, through a de novo review, noted that the
leafletters had met the Schmid criteria and reversed the convictions. See id.
81 See id. at 182, 486 A.2d at 916. The appellate division emphasized that proceedings against the defendants were completed with the acquittal and the leafletters'
request to allow an appeal just to receive a reported judicial statement was inappropriate. See id. The appellate division set forth other methods available to the defendants, including a declaratory judgment or an injunction. See id. at 183, 486 A.2d at
916.
82 203 N.J. Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900 (Ch. Div. 1984). For an in-depth discussion of
Brown, see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
83 204 N.J. Super. 531, 499 A.2d 535 (Ch. Div. 1985).
84 See id. at 535, 499 A.2d at 537. The picketing took place on the property of a
facility of Planned Parenthood, a nonprofit agency which performed numerous pregnancy and gynecological services including abortions. See id. at 533, 499 A.2d at 536.
Planned Parenthood of Monmouth County received half of its funding through public grants that were earmarked for contraceptive services and community education.
See id. at 533-34, 499 A.2d at 536. The Monmouth County division of Planned
Parenthood also received a preferred tax rate based on its not-for-profit status. See id.
at 534, 499 A.2d at 536. The court found that most of the picketing was conducted at
the rear of the building until the June 1, 1984, temporary restraining order was issued. See id. at 534-35, 499 A.2d at 537. Planned Parenthood of Monmouth County
sought to receive permanent injunctive relief based on its private status, while the
defendants asserted that through its financial support and open invitation Planned
Parenthood was in reality a public facility. See id. at 535, 499 A.2d at 537.
85 See id. at 541, 499 A.2d at 540. While finding the plaintiff to be a private entity,
the court distinguished the case from the holding in Belemead Development Corp. v.
Schneider, 196 N.J. Super. 571, 483 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1984). See id. at 538, 499 A.2d
at 538-39. For a discussion of Bellemead, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
The court opined that by receiving public funds, the facility was not exclusively private; therefore, the Schmid analysis must apply. See id. at 538, 499 A.2d at 539. The
court also made note of Brown v. Davis, 203 N.J. Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900 (Ch. Div.
1984), which still applied the Schmid three-prong analysis in ruling that the property
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explained that the quality of the factors, notjust the quantity, must
be balanced, and in this case all the factors weighed in favor of the
injunction.

86

A private college campus was the setting for State v. Guice,8 7
the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, decision involving a
trespass violation stemming from political leafletting at Stevens Institute of Technology. 8 In upholding the violation, the court distinguished the case from Schmid, finding that Stevens Institute was
not an "open campus."8 9 Unlike Princeton University, the court
found that Stevens's geographic location and deliberate policy to
keep its facilities private were essential factors in declaring that the
school was not subject to public use constitutional obligations. 90 In
applying the three-prong test, the court placed heavy emphasis on
" owner ha[d] not sufficiently dedicated the property to public use so as to entitle
individuals to access for First Amendment activity."' Id.
86 See id. at 541, 499 A.2d at 540. While noting that the first two prongs-the
normal use of the property was private and there was no invitation to the public to use
the facility-were in favor of Planned Parenthood, the court established that the third
element-the purpose of expression in relation to the private and public use of property-favored the defendant. See id. In balancing the factors, the court articulated
that the total number of factors on each side would not be outcome determinative but
that the quality of each factor should be weighed in formulating the result. See id.
The court continued by stating that the defendant's actions, including shouting and
verbally abusing the personnel, infringed too greatly on the private property owner's
rights. See id. at 543, 499 A.2d at 542.
87 262 N.J. Super. 607, 621 A.2d 553 (Law Div. 1993).
88 See id. at 609, 621 A.2d at 554. Stevens Institute of Technology (SIT) is a private
college located in Hoboken, New Jersey. See THE YALE DAILY NEWS, THE INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO THE COLLEGES, 396-98 (1995). In 1995, the school offered seven fields of
study including computer science, engineering, humanities, pre-dentistry, pre-law,
pre-med, and the sciences. See id. at 396. Undergraduate enrollment at SIT in 1995
was 1274, while total enrollment at the school equaled 2876 students. See id.
On October 22, 1990, the defendants set up a table on campus intending to
speak with students and distribute political literature. See Guice, 262 N.J. Super. at
609, 621 A.2d. at 554. After refusing to leave after being requested to do so, the
defendants were arrested and charged with criminal trespass pursuant to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:18-3. See id.
New Jersey's current criminal trespass statute states in relevant part that:
[a] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, knowing that
he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any
place as to which notice against trespass is given by: (1) [alctual communication to the actor; or (2) [p]osting in a manner prescribed by law
or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or (3)
[flencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-3(b) (West 1995).
89 See Guice, 262 N.J. Super. at 611-12, 621 A.2d at 555.
90 See id at 612 , 621 A.2d at 555-56. Important to the court's holding was SIT's
deliberate policy to maintain a private status. See id. The court determined that SIT
was a closed facility and, unlike Princeton, was not integrated with parts of the town.
See id Additionally, the court saw that there were only a limited amount of public
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the nature and extent of the invitation to the public.9 1 The court
92
concluded that not all universities were public fora.
Most recently, the NewJersey Supreme Court, in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,9 3 addressed whether denial of access to private shopping malls for
political and societal leafletting abridged freedom of expression
rights granted by the New Jersey Constitution.9 4 Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for a four-justice majority," initially established that
the societal phenomenon of migration from cities to suburbs resulted in a displacement of downtown business centers, formally
the meccas of commercial and social activity.9 6 The chief justice
emphasized the replacement of these fora with the modern shopping mall.9 7 Applying federal law, the majority declared that the
Federal Constitution did not provide for free speech in privately
owned shopping centers and that most state courts interpreted the
issue the same way. 98 The majority then acknowledged that the
uses and therefore found invitations to the public to be minimal. See id., 621 A.2d at
556.
91 See id. at 611, 621 A.2d at 555.
92 See id. Although agreeing that the first element of the test could be met by the
leafletters if the goal of the university was to foster expression and knowledge, the
court countered this by putting more emphasis on the invitation to the public. See id.
The court therefore found it unnecessary to reach the third factor of the test. See id.
at 613-14, 621 A.2d at 556.
93 138 NJ. 326, 650 A.2d 757 (1994).
94 See id. at 332, 650 A.2d at 760.
95 See id. at 404, 650 A.2d at 796. Justices Handler, O'Hern, and Stein joined the
chiefjustice. See id.
96 J.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 346, 650 A.2d at 767.
97 See id.: James M. McCauley, Transformingthe Privately Owned Shopping Center into a
Public Forum: Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 699, 721
(1981) (recognizing that downtown centers, where business once was rampant, have
been debased by the privately owned shopping center, thus spawning a necessary new
outlook toward these modem centers); Note, PrivateAbridgnent of Speech and the State
Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 168 (1980) (discussing the increase in numbers of
shopping centers from the time public forum definitions were created in the 1930s
and 1940s).
According to the chief justice, these shopping centers, with their vast variety of
functions, have become the "new downtowns" and posture an open door policy to the
public for business purposes. SeeJM.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 346, 650 A.2d at 767. In
many instances, the shopping mall is the most viable forum for public expression,
especially in the field of politics. See Note, supra, at 169.
98 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 349, 650 A.2d at 769. The majority noted that decisions in Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin have not allowed for free speech expression in privately owned shopping malls. See id. These states, according to the majority, often based their holdings on the Federal Constitution or state action doctrines.
See id.
The court did note that some states allowed leafletting under their own constitu-
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scope of free expression rights on private property was addressed
in State v. Schmid,99 finding that the NewJersey Constitution grants
greater free speech protection than its federal counterpart.100
In addressing the lower court's opinion, which held that the
constitutional grant should not apply because of a lack of dedication of the malls to the public,1"1 the majority emphasized the allencompassing nature of these establishments, including an implied
invitation to the public to leaflet. 102 Applying the three-factor balancing test, the majority determined what rights should be granted
to an individual's free expression, and what protection should be
given to private property owners.10 Chief Justice Wilentz strongly
suggested that the all-inclusiveness of shopping malls weighed
heavily in favor of a constitutional right to leaflet.10 4 The majority
opined that these open and multiple uses attract all types of people, inviting them to enjoy the non-commercial aspects of10the
cen5
result.
may
shopping
impulsive
some
that
ters with hope
The majority specifically mentioned the many speech-oriented, non-retail, non-commercial events that took place in these
tional or statutory provisions. See id.; see also Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592
P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the California free speech clause protects citizens
from both private and state action); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo.
1991) (relying on the state's free speech provision while also finding that a mall seeking to prohibit political literature was a state actor); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l,
Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983) (applying the state constitution's "free and equal
elections" provision); Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d 446 (Or. 1993) (relying on the
state constitution's referendum provision).
99 SeeJM.B. Realty, 138 NJ. at 352, 650 A.2d at 770; supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
100 SeejM.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 353, 650 A.2d at 770-71; see also State v. Hunt, 91 NJ.
338, 358-68, 450 A.2d 952, 962-68 (1982) (explaining the principles for interpreting
state constitutional provisions).
101 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 355, 650 A.2d at 772.
102 See id., 650 A.2d at 771-72. The majority stated that the focus should not be
limited to a stated purpose by the owner, but to the overall invitation to the public.
See id.
103 See id.at 356, 650 A.2d at 772.
104 See id. at 357, 650 A.2d at 772-73. The chiefjustice dismissed the argument that
the mall's primary purpose was commercial and for profit and focused instead on the
large open spaces, areas to sit and talk, the invitation to exercise, the theaters, restaurants, meeting rooms, and the prevalence of community booths. See id.The chief
justice believed that these permitted uses said to the public, "'[c]ome here, that's all
we ask. We hope you will buy, but you do not have to, and you need not intend to.
All we ask is that you come here. You can do whatever you want so long as you do not
interfere with other visitors.'" Id.
105 See id. at 358, 650 A.2d at 773. The majority noted the certainty that without
people present, regardless of the mall's stated purpose, no shopping would occur. See
id.

306

SETON HALL LAW REViEW

[Vol. 27:289

centers. 10 6 The court found these uses not only to be similar to
invitations found in downtown business districts, but in some cases
to exceed that invitation, given the open spaces, park-like settings,
and benches found in the malls. 10 7 The majority determined that
the intent of the malls was to bring the entire community into their
structures.10 8
Discussing the pervasiveness and breadth of issue-oriented
speech already permitted at the malls, the majority focused on the
power of mall owners to regulate leafletting. 10 9 Dismissing the defendants' claim that prohibiting leafletting was essential for mall
owners to protect their market, the majority declared that the intentional transformation of downtown shopping districts into a facility that invited the public for varied uses acted as an implied
invitation to leaflet. 1' The centers, according to Chief Justice Wilentz, attempted to take away the business of the downtown business districts without accepting the accompanying free speech
responsibility.'
The chief justice concluded that the initial two
factors, those relating to the normal use of the property and the
106 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 NJ. at 358-59, 650 A.2d at 773; see also id. at 379-90, 650
A.2d at 784-89 (listing permitted activities at the malls). Some examples of the permitted activities included: spring fashion shows, Easter Bunny arrival, Bugs Bunny
50th Anniversary Show, Trick or Treat at the Mall, Breakfast with Santa, Toys for Tots,
voter registration campaign, St. Elizabeth's Hospital cholesterol screening, Baby Fest,
Muppet Traffic Safety Show, bridal fairs, child ID day, Juvenile Diabetes Walk-a-Thon,
World Gym Aerobics presentation, St. Patrick's Day 5k run at the mall, Berlin Wall
exhibit, an appearance by soap opera character Jackson Montgomery of "All My Children," American Cancer Society daffodil sale, Bradley for U.S. Senate Voter Registration Drive, Fairleigh Dickinson University information, U.S. Army Recruiting
information, business and finance show, 5th annual Dell New Jersey crossword open,
"Riverside Rapids" speed chess tournament, musical concerts, and the MDA telethon.
See id. at 379-90, 650 A.2d at 784-89. Some malls permitted access to their facilities
during non-business hours for walkers or for the use of meeting rooms. See id.
107 See id. at 359, 650 A.2d at 773.
108 See id., 650 A.2d at 773-74.
109 See id. at 360, 650 A.2d at 774. The court noted that some malls' policies allowed community desks and booths to address a variety of issues. See id. at 359, 650
A.2d at 774. By discussing Woodbridge Center's policy, which enabled political and
community groups to distribute literature subject to regulation and permitted voter
registration drives that often involved walking through the mall and distributing leaflets, the court narrowed the issue before them to regulation. See id.
110 See id. at 360-61, 650 A.2d at 774. The chief justice stated:
This is the new, the improved, the more attractive downtown business
district-the new community-and no use is more closely associated

with the old downtown than leafletting ....

In a country where free

speech found its home in the downtown business district, these centers
can no more avoid speech than a playground avoid children, a library
its readers, or a park its strollers.
Id. at 361, 650 A.2d at 774.
11
SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 361, 650 A.2d at 775.
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extent of the invitation to the public, weighed strongly in favor of
the right to leaflet.11
In analyzing the third factor, the majority established that because expressive activity was permitted and compatible with the
malls' use, leafletting should be as well.113 Drawing from tradition
and history, the chief justice noted that leafletting and downtown
business districts had co-existed for more than two centuries.' 14
Further, the court found that the record did not substantiate the
mall owners' contention that distributing pamphlets would negatively affect their profits." 5 Any conflict arising between the objectives of profit and free expression, the majority opined, could be
offset by appropriate time, place, and manner restrictions on the
of comleafletting." 6 Thus, the majority concluded, the element
1 17
patibility favored the constitutional right to expression.
In finding that all three factors favored the plaintiffs, the court
held that regional and community shopping centers must allow individuals the reasonable exercise of expressive freedom, as granted
by the NewJersey Constitution, subject to the property owners' appropriate time, place, and manner restrictions." 8 To further support the court's decision, the chiefjustice also determined that the
case would be decided on a general balancing of private property
rights with free speech rights.' 19 Using a "functional equivalence"
analysis, the majority determined that malls constitute quasi-public
fora.'2 0 In relying on several federal decisions, the majority employed a sliding scale and found that the more a private property
owner opened up the property for public use, the greater the free
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id. The majority suggested that downtown business centers were not damaged by free speech and leafletting. See id. The court explained that although some
shoppers may find the leafletting to be an imposition, that fact did not bolster the
assertion that business would be lost. See id. The chiefjustice then reemphasized that
four malls had already permitted the leafletting in question. See id.
116 Seej.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 362, 650 A.2d at 775.
117 See id.
118 See id.

119 See id.

120 See id. at 363, 650 A.2d at 776. See also James Podgers, Free Speech in the New
Downtowns, 81 A.B.A. J. 54 (1995) (identifying the concerns over considering what
constitutes a public forum in an era where traditional downtown and public square
districts are giving way to more privatized venues). Podgers addressed the decisions
in JM.B. Realty as well as a Seventh Circuit opinion holding that public display cases in
O'Hare Airport were public fora and that the City of Chicago could not refuse advertising because that would violate the First Amendment. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l
v. Department of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995).
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speech rights the owner must permit to those using the property. 121 The court remarked that constitutional free speech rights
must prevail over the property rights in this case, given the ability

1 22
to conduct this speech with little cost to the mall owners.
The majority bolstered its reasoning by addressing the methods of communication in our changing society. 123 ChiefJustice Wilentz noted that although television had become a pervasive
medium in today's world, the viability of this type of information
dissemination was not dependent upon alternatives. 124 In fact, according to the chiefjustice, television would have a negative impact
on these types of groups, which often express minority viewpoints
not likely to be addressed by limited press coverage.' 25 Therefore,
Chief Justice Wilentz deduced that leafletting represented one of
the only cost-effective methods of reaching the public in New
Jersey.' 26 The chief justice surmised that as society has changed
centers,
and business districts have given way to regional shopping
127
path.
same
the
follow
must
speech
free
of
the rights
Having established the right to leaflet in these centers, the majority next addressed two defendants' assertions that this mandate

SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 363, 650 A.2d at 775.
See id. at 363-64, 650 A.2d at 776. The majority noted that the reasonable regulations on the expression, combined with the limited application of the expression,
would allow property owners the power to reduce any interference to shoppers and
profits to negligible amounts. See id. The court, although not using federal doctrine
in its decision, nonetheless noted that the United States Supreme Court had previously declared that a right to free speech granted by the Constitution shall not "be
determined by title to property alone." See id.at 366, 650 A.2d at 777.
The New Jersey court cited to its opinion in State v. Shack as support for its decision. See id. at 365, 650 A.2d at 777 (citing State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369
(1971)). In Shack, the court declared that two federal employees could enter private
property to give migrant workers information about federal assistance programs. 58
N.J. at 307-08, 277 A.2d at 374-75. The Shack court noted that in certain circumstances private property rights must retreat against those rights held by society. See id.
at 303, 277 A.2d at 372.
123 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 366-67, 650 A.2d at 777.
124 See id. at 367, 650 A.2d at 777-78. Free speech, Chief Justice Wilentz declared,
never has and never should be dependent on the means of any other type of communication. See id. Additionally, the chief justice found the expense of television, costing between $23,000-$155,000 for a 30-second advertisement, made it an impractical
alternative for this group. See id. 650 A.2d at 778.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 368, 650 A.2d at 778.
127 See id. The chief justice opined that the New Jersey constitutional provision
dealing with free speech was not created with an expectation of its diminishment as
society changed. See id. at 370, 650 A.2d at 779. ChiefJustice Wilentz noted that free
speech should not cease with a new method of business, but rather the right of free
speech should move with society and include a right to leaflet at these centers. See id.
121

122
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was a deprivation of property without due process of law, 128 a taking without just compensation, 129 and an infringement upon the
mall owners' right to free speech.13 0 Under the Federal Constitution, the majority noted, the Supreme Court struck down these
same contentions in PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins.'3 1 In analyzing the New Jersey Constitution, the majority likewise rejected
these arguments, adding that when property rights drastically curtail free speech in an effort to avoid minimal interference with the
2
property, property rights must yield to those of free speech.11
While the New Jersey Constitution assures compensation for property taken, the court reiterated that it does not provide for compensation for actions
bearing little or no impact on the profitability
33
of the centers.1

Lastly, the majority clarified the application and limitations of
the holding.1 4 The chief justice applied this holding to all regional shopping centers and the one community shopping
center.135 In accepting the differences in degree of public activity
from center to center, the majority perceived these differences as
immaterial in allowing free speech activity. 136 Addressing the defendants' contention that this disregard of the degree of public activity would lead to future litigation, the supreme court specifically
128 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 NJ. at 370, 650 A.2d at 779; U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating
in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."); U.S. CONsr. amend V (stating
in relevant part that "... . nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."); N.J. CoNsr. art. I, 6 (stating in relevant part that "[e]very
person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right [and that] [n]o law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."); N.J. CONSr. art. I, 20 (stating that
"[pirivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation [and
that] [i]ndividuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private
property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.").
129 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 370, 650 A.2d at 779; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 370, 650 A.2d at 779; U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
131 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 370, 650 A.2d at 779. For an in-depth discussion on
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pruneyard,see supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
132 See J.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 371, 650 A.2d at 780. The majority explained,
"[t]hat does not mean that one is fundamentally more important than the other,
although we believe it is, but rather that here the correct resolution of the conflict
between these rights is self-evident." Id.
133 See id. at 372, 650 A.2d at 780.
134 See id. at 372-78, 650 A.2d at 780-83.
135 See id. at 372 n.16, 650 A.2d at 780 n.16. The majority declared that its holding
did not pertain to all community shopping centers and stated that more information
would be necessary to make that determination. See id.
136 See id. at 372-73, 650 A.2d at 780.
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and prospectively
limited the holding to certain private property
7
venues.

13

The majority limited free expression rights in the shopping
centers to passive leafletting concerning political and societal free
speech. 3 ' Chief Justice Wilentz noted that commercial free
speech would be in great disharmony with the use of the malls and
thus could not garner constitutional protection. 39 Additionally,
the majority limited free expression to leafletting and emphasized
that the holding only included normal speech necessary for effective leafletting140 Regarding the property owners' concern that
potential violence between opposing groups may arise,"' the majority declared that free speech by its nature has always allowed for
this possibility, but that the control mechanisms
possessed by the
142
mall owners would make disturbance unlikely.
In reversing the appellate division, the New Jersey Supreme
137 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 373, 650 A.2d at 781. Property on which the court
would not extend permission to leaflet included highway strip malls, football stadiums, theaters, single suburban stores, stand alone uses, and small to medium shopping centers. See id. The invitations in these venues, according to the majority, did
not draw near the multitude of uses found at the regional shopping centers. See id. at
374, 650 A.2d at 781. The limited activity at each of the above places, the chiefjustice
concluded, may be substantially interfered with by this exercise of free speech. See id.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 375, 650 A.2d at 781-82. The majority found commercial speech to be
a substantial intrusion on the property rights of shopping center owners insofar as
leafletting could be distributed suggesting that customers shop elsewhere. See id.
140 See id. at 375-76, 650 A.2d at 782. The majority did not include in its holding
bullhorns, megaphones, soapboxes, placards, pickets, parades, or demonstrations. See
id. Likewise, the court noted that free speech would be limited only to what was
needed to attract passers-by "without pressure, harassment, following, [or] pestering,
of any kind." Id. at 376, 650 A.2d at 782. Also, the court noted that the "sale of
literature and the solicitation of funds on the spot" would not be protected. Id.
141 See id. at 377 n.18, 650 A.2d 782 n.18. The court acknowledged a 1983 disturbance in a Connecticut mall where the National Organization of Women was allowed
to solicit signatures, but the Ku Klux Klan was denied similar access. See id. When the
members of the Ku Klux Klan arrived, a counter demonstration arose and outside
police forces, including swat teams from two counties, were called to calm the disturbance, causing several stores to close for the day. See id.; see also Scott G. Bullock, The
Mall's In Their Court, REASON, Aug. 18, 1995, at 47 (stating that in the months following this riot, sales declined 35% at the mall).
142 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 377-78, 650 A.2d at 782-83. The majority, finding
the property owners' regulatory powers to be broad, stated that malls could limit
leafletting to certain days and a certain quantity of days, as long as these restrictions
were reasonable and not a blanket restriction on a viable day. See id. Leafletting
could also be confined to designated places such as parking lots outside the mall or
different wings of the centers in order to avoid conflicts between groups. See id. at
378, 650 A.2d at 783. The supreme court cautioned, however, that some leafletting
would require an indoor forum to be effective. See id. The majority expected that
other problems could be worked out between the parties involved. See id.
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Court gave the malls sixty days to enact reasonable regulations that
would satisfy both the interests of the malls and the leafletting
rights of the Coalition. 143 ChiefJustice Wilentz concluded that this
holding would assure New Jersey citizens of their right to be
heard.' 4 4 The chief justice expected this expressive right to be as
business centers repreeffective as it had been when downtown
145
sented the community gathering place.
A vigorous dissent, 146 authored by Justice Garibaldi, denounced the majority for twisting the factors established in State v.
Schmid.' 4 7 Justice Garibaldi also declared that the majority had neglected consideration of private property owners' rights, given little
credence to the findings of fact at the trial court level, and relied
upon outdated, rejected federal holdings in lieu of current federal
and state constitutional applications.

1"'

Justice Garibaldi believed

that the majority's holding would only cloud the issue of free expression on private property, spawning more problems than
solutions. 149

In acknowledging the state's ability to expand federal individual rights under state constitutions, the dissent emphasized that
access to private shopping malls' property for leafletting had been
rejected by most states.1 50 Asserting that the majority's holding neglected to balance all the provisions of Article I of the New Jersey
Constitution, the dissent claimed that the decision only addressed
free speech and assembly provisions. 5 ' The dissent urged that for
144

See id. at 379, 650 A.2d at 783-84.
See id. at 378, 650 A.2d at 783.

145

See id.

143

See Russ Bleemer, Leafletters Now Await Rules-and a PossibleAppea4 N.J. L.J., Dec.
26, 1994, at 17. Justice Robert Clifford and Appellate division Judge Herman Michels
joined Justice Garibaldi. See id. Justice Pollack did not participate in this case due to a
conflict; his son-in-law was a partner at the firm representing two of the defendant
malls, Cherry Hill Center, and Woodbridge Center. See id.
147 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 390, 650 A.2d at 789 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 390-92, 650 A.2d at 789-90 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
contrasted the majority holding with that of two similar cases in Pennsylvania. See id.
at 392, 650 A.2d at 790 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Commonwealth v. Tate, 432
A.2d 1382, 1391 (Pa. 1981) (overturning a trespass conviction against distributors of
leaflets on a college campus); Western Pa. Socialist Workers v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1336-37 (Pa. 1986) (holding that an invitee to a shopping
mall has no right to engage in activities undesirable to the landlord and that malls are
not considered to be public fora because they exchange goods and services, not
ideas)).
149 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 390, 650 A.2d at 789 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 391, 650 A.2d at 789 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
6 (stating in relevant part that "[e]very person may
151 See id.; N.J. CONST. Art. I,
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
publish
his
freely speak, write and
the abuse of that right [and that] [n]o law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
146
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the analysis to be correct, the paragraphs based on private property
rights and just compensation should also be considered. 5 2 The
dissent argued that omitting consideration of the private property
provisions of the constitution would yield an inappropriate factor
analysis under State v. Schmid.'
Accepting the trial court's finding of fact, the dissent stated
that the only conclusion that could be drawn was the primary use
of the malls was commercial. 54 Profits, the dissent noted, drive the
malls to attempt to draw people to their facility to spend money,
not to do whatever they please once inside the building.1 55 Justice
Garibaldi, in rejecting the finding that mall owners issued a general invitation to the public to use the malls for all things, questioned the56accuracy of the majority's analogy to downtown business
districts. 1

In distinguishing Schmid from the present situation, the dissent found that the different purposes of malls and universities is a
vital and distinctive factor.' 57 The dissent noted that while an open
discourse and free flow of ideas enhanced education, this discourse
did not have the same effect on shopping. 15

Finding that the ma-

liberty of speech or of the press"); N.J. CONST. Art. I, 9 18 (stating in relevant part
that "[t]he people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for
redress of grievances").
152 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 391, 650 A.2d at 789 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); NJ.
CONST. Art. I, 1 (stating that "[a]ll persons are by nature free and independent, and
have certain natural and inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness"); N.J. CONsT. Art. I,
20 (stating that
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation [and
that] [i]ndividuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private
property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners"). Justice
Garibaldi noted that the right to free speech does not exist whenever an audience can
be found and that only a forum, not an audience, is guaranteed by the constitution.
SeeJM.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 402, 650 A.2d at 796 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
153 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 NJ. at 391, 650 A.2d at 789 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
154 See id. at 393, 650 A.2d at 790 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent lamented
that the first element of Schmid should weigh in favor of the mall owners. See id.
Justice Garibaldi criticized the majority's application of the first factor, finding that
they ignored the "nature, purpose and primary use" language used in Schmid, inserting the term "normal use" instead. See id. at 394, 650 A.2d at 791 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
155 See id. at 393, 650 A.2d at 791 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 394, 650 A.2d at 791 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (finding that the general invitation was for shoppers to do business with the merchants and promotional activity attempted to bring in
these people to benefit the entire center)).
157 See id. at 395, 650 A.2d at 791 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
158 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 NJ. at 395, 650 A.2d at 791 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Jus-
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jority disregarded the commercial purpose of malls, the justice
commented that in the future all large spaces open to the public
might be declared public fora, subject to all freedom of expression
59

rights. 1
Justice Garibaldi next examined the final prong of the Schmid
test-the purpose of the expressive activity and its relationship to
the public and private use of the malls.16 Finding opposition to
the Gulf War incompatible with the commercial purpose of the
mall owners, the dissent stated that allowing politically-oriented
groups to leaflet would only lead to burdensome decisions for mall
owners and a future filled with litigation over the appropriateness
of standards. 6 ' Problems of this caliber may be acceptable for
public officials, but the justice objected to private property owners
having to decide such value-based questions, noting that time,
place, and manner restrictions were problematic in other
62

contexts. 1

Rejecting the majority's determination that regional shopping
centers-the functional equivalent of the former business districts-had decimated these former free speech hotbeds, the dissent countered by noting that many business districts have actually
shown improvement. 6 3 Additionally, the dissent concluded, the
majority's functional equivalence standard was premised on the
reasoning of discredited federal decisions, such as Marsh and Logan
Valley, and could not be relied upon in favoring expressive
tice Garibaldi noted that "[sIhopping can be accomplished even with mouths shut
and minds closed." Id.
159 See id., 650 A.2d at 792 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
160 See id.
161 See id. at 396-97, 650 A.2d at 792-93 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent acknowledged the dangers associated with allowing unpopular political groups access to
the mall. See id. (citing Cologne v. Westfarm Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1205 (Conn.
1984)). Addressing the dilemma mall owners may face, Justice Garibaldi questioned
how mall owners should handle pro-choice and pro-life groups, animal rights groups,
or opposition groups wishing to leaflet on the same day. See id. at 396, 650 A.2d at 792
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
162 See id. at 397, 650 A.2d at 793 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Specifically troubling,
Justice Garibaldi stated, are the repercussions that had been demonstrated when public officials have had to make time, place, and manner restrictions. See id. (citing
National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977) (scheduling
Nazi parade outside village hall led to outrage in community)). For a complete discussion of the incident in Skokie, see generally DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNs, NAZIs IN
SKOIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FirsT AMENDMENT (1985) (discussing in depth
the Skokie controversy and interviewing key figures in the case).
163 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 NJ. at 397, 650 A.2d at 793 (Garibaldi, J, dissenting). Justice Garibaldi noted that towns located in Essex, Hudson, and Morris counties had
actually undergone a revitalization in the areas surrounding the malls. See id.
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rights.16 4

Distinguishing the shopping malls from downtown business
districts, the dissent expressed that these centers in no way resembled a community. 165 Justice Garibaldi specifically found that the
malls lacked the locations that generate an exchange of ideas in
communities, such as libraries, schools, town halls, and even the
corner grocery. 166 The dissent also noted the lack of a political
body elected by the people, leading Justice Garibaldi to note that
shoppers do not have, or expect to have, any say in the daily affairs
of the mall. 6 7 The justice proclaimed that shoppers primarily
visit
168
the mall to shop, not to engage in political discourse.
Similarly, the dissent denounced the majority's reliance on
State v. Shack, finding the Coalition's situation amenable to alternative means of communication that were not present in the common law ruling of that case. 169 Most notable, according to the
dissent, was the status of the impoverished workers under the control of a single property owner that compelled the invasion of private property rights in Shack.170 The dissent urged that the
Coalition's target audience, mall patrons, hardly reached such a
disadvantaged
status as to require such an invasion of the mall own1
ers' rights.

17

The dissent asserted that the majority's holding lacked any
foundation to distinguish malls from other public gathering places
and opened a "Pandora's Box" of potential future claims.'

72

Jus-

tice Garibaldi addressed concern that the majority, by limiting the
holding to regional malls, had actually limited nothing based on its
73
disregard for the identity of the party preventing the speech.
The result, according to the justice, would lead to no restrictions
on expressive activity, contrary to the purpose established in the
164 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 398-99, 650 A.2d at 793-94 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that the majority's holding was based only on functional equivalence and that it circumvented the factor analysis required by Schmid. See id. at 399,
650 A.2d at 793 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
165 See id. at 400, 650 A.2d at 794 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 NJ. 400-01, 650 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
170 See id. at 401, 650 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
171 See id.
172 See id. Justice Garibaldi pondered the question of whether sports stadiums,
county fairs, theaters, large office buildings, apartment houses, and department stores
would be subject to the holding in this case where the commercial aspect of their
enterprise is disregarded. See id.
173 See id. at 402, 650 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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New Jersey Constitution.'
Justice Garibaldi concluded the dissent's analysis with a pragmatic look at the economic realities of the holding. 17 5 The dissent
suggested that the costs of protecting speech in the malls will be
filtered through to the consumer in the guise of expanded security
and infrastructure.1 76 Justice Garibaldi noted that malls, unlike
municipalities, would not be protected by the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act 177 and, therefore, would bear the potential costs of free
79
access in the future.' 7 Given the availability of other fora,1 Jus-

tice Garibaldi found the majority's holding to be a convenience to
the leafletters.' ° Convenience, the justice opined, should not
compel free speech protection under the New Jersey
Constitution.

18 1

In New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. JM.B.
Realty Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court was called upon to balance the free speech rights of leafletters with the private property
rights of the owners. By favoring leafletting, the majority circumvented established precedent and the firmly incorporated application of the unanimously created factor analysis test in Schmid. As
noted in the dissent, the majority distorted the factor analysis, placing extreme emphasis on the vast activities permitted in the
malls.1" 2 The analysis, however, required an examination of the
174 SeeJM.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 402, 650 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
175 See id. at 403, 650 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
176 See id.; see also Neisser, supra note 14, at 41 (discussing the costs to consumers of
free speech).
177 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 403, 650 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). The
NewJersey Tort Claims Act essentially declares it to be public policy that "public entities" shall only be liable in negligence within the limitations of the Act. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 59:1-1 to 12-3 (West 1992).
178 SeeJ.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. at 403, 650 A.2d at 795 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). Following the law of economics, the dissent deduced that the extra burden placed upon
the private mall owners in the form of security and devices necessary to control expressional activity would be passed on to the consumer. See id.
179 See id. at 404, 650 A.2d at 796 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). The dissent listed train
stations, bus stops, parks, outside supermarkets, post offices, and current downtown
shopping districts, coupled with the availability of the media, as methods of access to
audiences for the Coalition. See id.
180 See id. at 403, 650 A.2d at 796 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).

181 See id.
182 See id. at 390, 650 A.2d at 789 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); Kathy Barrett Carter,
Malls, ACLU Clash Before High Court Over Access for Advocacy Groups, STAR-LEDGER, Mar.
15, 1994, at 9. At oral argument, Justice Stein challenged the assertion that these
activities were to promote shopping, stating, "it makes one scratch his head" to find
the link between crossword and chess tournaments and shopping. See Carter, supra,at
9. Justice Handler expressed that some of the groups already in the malls could be
considered an annoyance. See id.
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nature and primary use of the facility, as well as the relationship
between the expression and the use of the property. While the
court may weigh each factor individually, it is difficult to reconcile
the court's approach with the factor analysis, a difficulty evidenced
by the shift from a unanimous holding in Schmid, to a four-justice
majority opinion when applying the same test in the context of a
shopping mall.
Furthermore, bringing into question the majority's factor
analysis is the reliance upon a general balancing between competing rights of property and speech. This balancing, coupled with a
fallback to cases such as Marsh and Logan Valley, which have been
rejected by the federal courts, lends credence to the majority's
functional equivalence standard; but it does so on faulty grounds.
The backbone of the majority's opinion emphasized the malls' deliberate destruction of the former downtown business districts.
That analysis, however, truly fails to fathom the private nature of
the malls. While the majority harkens back to yesteryear to recant
the co-existence of expression in the old town squares, it completely ignored the property owner's constitutionally protected
right of exclusion. The majority likewise ignores the investment
and designing that went into the formation of these establishments, intending only to attract shoppers and create profits.
Further, the supreme court disregarded the primary users of
the malls-shoppers. The majority dismissed the possibility that
consumers have chosen malls as an alternative to the business districts in an effort to get away from political activity and focus on
shopping.183 In general, consumers go to malls to shop."" Shop183 See Bullock, supra note 141, at 46 (noting that consumers ultimately choose
where they desire to shop and in this instance, malls have been chosen to avoid the
city-like atmosphere of downtown districts including the crime, noise, protests, litter,
and panhandling that take place).
184 See ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION, Roper Poll, June 1, 1987, available in
WESTLAW, POLL-C Database [hereinafter Roper Poll]. A 1987 Roper Poll surveying
1980 adults asked respondents if the following factors were reasons for their going to
a shopping mall:
It's a pleasant place to go to just look around, see people, etc.
Is a reason ............................................
52%
Is not a reason ........................................
47%
Don't know ........................................
1%
I know a lot of people who go there and I'm likely to run into people I
know and can spend time with.
Is a reason ............................................
14%
Is not a reason ........................................
84%
D on't know ...........................................
1%
There are things to do for entertainment in the mall.
Is a reason ............................................
22%
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pers tend to favor the mall owners' rights to exclude many activities
that interfere with shopping. 8 5 Additionally, consumers will be
Is not a reason ........................................
76%
D on't know ...........................................
2%
There are one or two really good restaurants in the mall.
Is a reason ............................................
22%
Is not a reason ........................................
76%
D on't know ...........................................
2%
There are a number of eating places to chose from in the mall.
Is a reason ............................................
30%
Is not a reason ........................................
69%
Don't know ...........................................
1%
There are specialty stores in the mall, like shoe stores, clothing stores,
record stores, etc.
Is a reason ............................................
70%
Is not a reason ........................................
29%
Don't know ........................................
1%
It has a particular store or two that I need or like.
Is a reason ............................................
.80%
Is not a reason ........................................
19%
D on't know ...........................................
1%
There are one or two really good department stores.
Is a reason ............................................
70%
Is not a reason ........................................
29%
D on't know ...........................................
2%
It is a comfortable way to go to a number of stores on one shopping trip.
Is a reason ............................................
85%
Is not a reason ........................................
14%
D on't know ...........................................
1%
Id.
185 See id. A 1986 Roper Poll surveying 1998 adults asked respondents
ing should be allowed regardless of mall owner's feelings, or should be
the mall owner chooses to prohibit it?
Soliciting money for charities.
Allowed regardless .....................................
Prohibited if mall owner wants ..........................
D on' t know ...........................................
Soliciting signatures for petitions.
Allowed regardless .....................................
Prohibited if mall owner wants ..........................
D on't know ...........................................
Soliciting money for religious groups.
Allowed regardless .....................................
Prohibited if mall owner wants ..........................
D on't know ......... .................................
Soliciting money for political causes.
Allowed regardless .....................................
Prohibited if mall owner wants ..........................
D on't know ...........................................
Passing out literature for political causes.
Allowed regardless .....................................
Prohibited if mall owner wants ..........................
D on't know ...........................................

if the followprohibited if
30%
65%
5%
33%
62%
5%
18%
77%
5%
15%
80%
5%
30%
65%
5%
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the ones to foot the bill for the activity in the form of higher costs
stemming from increased security, requirements of more insurance, and potential litigation deriving from restrictions placed on
expressional groups.1"
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in joining California as
the only other state to require that its constitutional free speech
clause mandate access to shopping malls for expressional activity,
has struck a blow to private property rights."8 7 Still unknown is the
cost to society of requiring access to shopping centers for expressional activity. The JM.B. Realty decision will likely spawn a wave of
confusion and potential litigation, and in its wake leave property
owners and consumers holding the bag. Leafletting, a recognized
part of our democratic history, would not perish had the court denied the Coalition access to the private malls, because many viable
public fora still exist to allow groups to disseminate their messages.
Moreover, in side-stepping Schmid, the question that remains is
what forum will next be labeled quasi-public? Evidenced by its restrictive and narrow holding, the majority has blurred the distinction between public and private fora, subjecting its citizens to a
grave disservice, while passing over the established rights of property owners. The discount of private property rights is a sale that
no mall owner chose to purchase, and a bargain that in the end
will only result in consumers, left out of the process, footing the
bill.
Maurice F. Kirchofer III

186 See Bleemer, supra note 146, at 17. Defense attorneys believe insurance coverage may become a sticking point for litigation and is an issue that has not been clearly
resolved by the decision. See id. at 19. Ronald Wiss, who argued the case for Rockaway Townsquare and Livingston Mall, when discussing the rules malls would implement, stated that the costs of maintenance and risk may have to be passed on, but the
fact that these costs may prevent small groups from access may result in litigation. See
id.
187 See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979) (allowing high
school students to solicit petitions in the mall under state constitutional right to free

speech).

